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SAVED BY LABELL:  LOCAL TAXATION OF 
VIDEO STREAMING SERVICES 
Salvatore Cocchiaro* 
 
Over the last few years, Netflix and other video streaming services have 
erupted to become a preeminent form of entertainment for millennials and 
the public at large.  With traditional forms of entertainment waning, video 
streaming services represent a novel source of revenue for cities.  Local 
governments currently have numerous tax approaches that may be used to 
cover these services. 
Different cities and states have taken distinctive approaches to taxing 
these services.  Certain jurisdictions tax them in line with traditional pay-TV 
providers under utility taxes, while other jurisdictions tax them under sales 
or amusement taxes.  This Note considers these different approaches, with a 
focus on Labell v. City of Chicago, a 2018 case upholding Chicago’s 
application of its amusement tax to Netflix and other video streaming 
services. 
Recognizing the various constraints that state and federal laws place on 
local taxation, this Note outlines the benefits and drawbacks of different 
approaches and highlights the challenges that cities should consider when 
issuing interpretive rulings to bring video streaming services into their tax 
bases.  This Note suggests that other cities should draw on Labell and follow 
Chicago’s lead in taxing these services under existing amusement tax laws 
where possible, given the easier procedural hurdles, strong theoretical 
backing, and recent supporting precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the phrase goes, nothing in life is certain but death and taxes.1  The 
2002 smash-hit film Chicago,2 based on the 1975 Broadway musical of the 
same name, chronicles a satirical murder trial in Chicago during the Roaring 
Twenties.  As the story goes, the brilliant attorney Billy Flynn razzle-dazzles3 
his way to victory against the City, exclaiming:  “Believe me, if Jesus Christ 
had lived in Chicago today and if he had five thousand dollars and he’d come 
to me, let’s just say things would have turned out differently.”4  At the heart 
of this Note is another Chicago trial, not concerning death but taxes. 
In Labell v. City of Chicago,5 a Chicago trial court considered whether the 
city’s taxation of Netflix and other video streaming services was valid, 
despite municipal tax limitations, dormant Commerce Clause issues, and the 
 
 1. See Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 
THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789–1790, at 68, 69 (Albert Henry Smith ed., 1907), 
http://archive.org/details/writingsofbenjam10franuoft/page/68 [http://perma.cc/8kkh-xvc4]. 
 2. CHICAGO (Miramax Films 2002). 
 3. See RICHARD GERE, Razzle Dazzle, on CHICAGO:  MUSIC FROM THE MIRAMAX MOTION 
PICTURE (Epic Records 2002). 
 4. CHICAGO, supra note 2, at 41:02. 
 5. No. 15 CH 13399, 2018 BL 212206 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 24, 2018). 
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Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA).6  As consumers continue to cut the cord 
and ditch traditional pay-TV, the decision in Labell has potentially massive 
revenue implications not only for Chicago, but also for the multitude of cities 
and states mulling these so-called “Netflix taxes.”7  Fortunately for them, the 
City of Chicago prevailed and the court upheld the tax’s validity and 
provided a roadmap for similar challenges.8  The issue, however, is far from 
settled.  Judicial challenges continue to pop up,9 while Labell itself remains 
on appeal.10  In light of Labell, this Note examines the question:  Under what 
authority can cities tax video streaming services such as Netflix? 
Part I of this Note addresses the rise of video streaming services and their 
relationship to traditional pay-TV providers, or multichannel video 
programming distributors (MVPDs).  It then examines basic tools of tax 
interpretation, including the substance-over-form doctrine and the sliding 
scale of deference afforded to tax-commissioner rulings.  Finally, it considers 
various principles of local taxation, with a focus on the variety of taxing 
approaches at a local government’s disposal. 
Part II of this Note surveys the current state and local government 
approaches that tax video streaming services differently from MVPDs, with 
a focus on Labell.  It then considers approaches that tax video streaming 
services in line with MVPDs, as illustrated in Netflix, Inc. v. Finance & 
Administration Cabinet Department of Revenue.11  Lastly, it considers key 
constraints on local taxation, including state limitations on municipal tax 
discretion, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, and the ITFA. 
Part III argues that in light of Labell, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,12 and 
the deference afforded to tax commissioner rulings, cities should follow the 
same roadmap and issue interpretive rulings to bring video streaming 
services into the taxable fold via an amusement tax.  Furthermore, 
recognizing the substance-over-form doctrine and the practical difficulties 
 
 6. Id. at *1. 
 7. This Note refers to taxes on “video streaming services” rather than “Netflix taxes” 
because, while the latter is catchy, it is counterproductive, making such taxation politically 
unpalatable. See John Buhl, Netflix and Bill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2018-02-12/the-netflix-tax-
how-states-are-attempting-to-tax-consumption [https://perma.cc/9TUR-BPVK] (suggesting 
that failed attempts at video streaming service taxation by Louisiana and Virginia were due in 
part to their “eye-popping label[s]”).  A number of cities and states, such as Chicago, 
Pennsylvania, and Florida, have enacted such taxes. Mike Snider, A ‘Netflix Tax’?  Yes, and 
It’s Already a Thing in Some States, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/tech/news/2017/08/17/netflix-tax-yes-and-its-already-thing-some-states/500416001/ 
[https://perma.cc/QC3Q-4PHU]. 
 8. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *12. 
 9. See, e.g., Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief, City of Creve Coeur v. 
Netflix, Inc., No. 4:18-cv-01495 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 6, 2018), ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter Creve 
Coeur Petition]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Apple Inc. v. City of 
Chicago, No. 2018L05052014 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter Apple Complaint]. 
 10. See Appellants’ Brief at 2, Labell v. City of Chicago, No. 1-18-1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Dec. 5, 2018) (stating that the plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on June 21, 2018). 
 11. No. K-24900, 2015 WL 5692791 (Ky. B.T.A. Sept. 23, 2015). 
 12. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
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cities face in taxation, this Note concludes by suggesting that cities should 
feel at liberty to elect any consumption tax they prefer to bring these services 
within their tax bases. 
I.  ACT ONE:  VIDEO STREAMING SERVICES, LOCAL TAXATION, 
AND “ALL THAT JAZZ” 
To discuss local taxation of video streaming services, it is important to 
understand the industry, taxation schemes, and “all that jazz.”13  Part I.A 
describes what video streaming services are and their role in the media and 
entertainment industry, including their relationship with MVPDs.  Part I.B 
addresses tools of tax interpretation, including the substance-over-form 
doctrine and the deference afforded to tax commissioner rulings.  Part I.C 
assesses the various approaches that cities have taken to tax these video 
streaming services. 
A.  Modern-Day TV:  Video Streaming Services 
Any discussion regarding video streaming services must begin with an 
introduction to key terminology.  Video streaming services14 enable users to 
access video content via the internet without using TV subscription providers 
or permanently downloading such content.15  Video streaming services may 
be further broken down into primarily two distinct models:  subscription 
video on demand (SVOD), and transactional video on demand (TVOD).16  
The SVOD model provides access to a bundle of content for one flat price.17  
Key players in this area currently include Netflix and Hulu.18  The TVOD 
model provides access to individual films or TV titles for a limited period, 
typically structured as a forty-eight hour rental.19  Key players in this area 
 
 13. See CATHERINE ZETA-JONES, Overture/And All That Jazz, on CHICAGO:  MUSIC FROM 
THE MIRAMAX MOTION PICTURE (Epic Records 2002). 
 14. Different authors use different terminology to refer to such providers, including, but 
not limited to:  video streaming services, video service providers, over-the-top (OTT) 
providers, internet streaming service providers, internet-based streaming services, and online 
video service providers.  Although these terms emphasize different aspects of the business, 
they are interchangeable for purposes of this Note’s treatment of the taxation issue.  This 
Note’s preferred term is video streaming services. 
 15. Outlook Segment Definitions:  OTT Video, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ 
industries/tmt/media/outlook/segment-definitions.html [https://perma.cc/D6C3-MK32] (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2019); see also Sahil Patel, WTF Is OTT?, DIGIDAY (July 7, 2015), 
https://digiday.com/media/what-is-over-the-top-ott/ [https://perma.cc/5DWM-2AZT].  For 
the purposes of this Note, streamed content does not include permanently downloaded 
purchases, despite their conflation in the everyday use of the term. 
 16. Outlook Segment Definitions:  OTT Video, supra note 15; see also Patel, supra note 
15.  There is a third category of OTT, advertising video on demand.  Due to its relatively small 
market size compared to SVOD and TVOD, this Note will not discuss this segment. 
 17. Patel, supra note 15; see, e.g., What Is Netflix?, NETFLIX, https://help.netflix.com/ 
en/node/412 [https://perma.cc/HP5L-7RTN] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (describing Netflix as 
a service in which a subscriber pays a flat, monthly fee to access unlimited streaming content). 
 18. Patel, supra note 15. 
 19. Id.; see, e.g., Rent Movies from the iTunes Store, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/en-
us/HT201611 [https://perma.cc/9CKA-7DXM] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (explaining that 
iTunes video rentals last forty-eight hours after a user begins watching). 
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currently include iTunes and Vimeo On Demand.20  Amazon’s video 
streaming service, Prime Video, offers users both an SVOD option and a 
TVOD option.21 
Over the last decade, video streaming services have reached near ubiquity.  
While video streaming services continue to grow and dominate the current 
entertainment and media landscape, related traditional industries have taken 
massive hits over the last decade.  The home-video industry, largely 
represented by Blockbuster, has been rated the number one dying industry in 
America.22  Movie theater attendance in North America is at its lowest point 
since 1992—the continuation of an ongoing drop in attendance and domestic 
revenue.23  Physical disc sales in the United States continue to plummet and 
have experienced double-digit percentage declines in back-to-back years.24  
Traditional pay-TV providers, including cable and satellite providers, are 
experiencing larger-than-expected subscriber losses25 and declining 
advertising revenues26 as “cord-cutting” continues to accelerate.  Illustrative 
of this trend, traditional pay-TV providers recently experienced their largest 
quarterly loss ever.27  Scholars and practitioners attribute this decline to an 
ascendant video streaming industry.28 
 
 20. Patel, supra note 15. 
 21. Andy Beatman, What Is Prime Video?, AMAZON PRIME INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.amazon.com/primeinsider/video/prime-video-qa.html [https://perma.cc/7LE3-
6S3T] (“With an eligible Amazon Prime membership, you have access to thousands of Prime 
Video titles at no additional cost.  You also have the option to rent . . . movies and TV episodes 
not included with Prime Video.”). 
 22. Trey Thoelcke, Video Rental Is America’s Most Quickly Dying Industry, 24/7 WALL 
ST. (Dec. 30, 2016), https://247wallst.com/services/2016/12/30/video-rental-is-americas-
most-quickly-dying-industry/ [https://perma.cc/W5CK-F7NH].  Based upon data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, industry employment is down 89 percent from its high in 2006, 
and Blockbuster has shut all of its locations since declaring bankruptcy in 2010. Id. 
 23. Lizzie Plaugic, Domestic Movie Theater Attendance Hit a 25-Year Low in 2017, 
VERGE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/3/16844662/movie-theater-
attendance-2017-low-netflix-streaming [https://perma.cc/6TUM-EDR7]. 
 24. Ricardo Lopez, Disc Sales Decline Deepens in Annual Home Entertainment Spending 
Report, VARIETY (Jan. 9, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/home-entertainment-
spending-2017-1202658638/ [https://perma.cc/MFA5-747N]. 
 25. See David Z. Morris, Viewers Are Ditching Cable for Streaming Faster Than Anyone 
Expected, FORTUNE (Apr. 29, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/04/29/viewers-cable-streaming/ 
[https://perma.cc/3UKD-AFL3]. 
 26. See Sapna Maheshwari & John Koblin, Why Traditional TV Is in Trouble, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/media/television-
advertising.html [https://perma.cc/FSP8-S88G]. 
 27. The loss of more than one million subscribers from July to September 2018 was the 
largest ever, with pay-TV subscriptions now down from 86 percent in 2013 to 78 percent in 
2018.  Some predict the downhill trend will continue and that number will continue to fall. 
See Mike Snider, Cord Cutting Accelerates as Pay TV Loses One Million Customers in 
Largest-Ever Quarterly Loss, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
tech/talkingtech/2018/11/07/cord-cutting-accelerates-1-m-customers-dropped-pay-tv-last-
quarter/1919471002/ [https://perma.cc/A97M-GKLD]. 
 28. See Lopez, supra note 24 (claiming that decreased ownership of movie titles is due to 
consumer preference for video streaming services); Maheshwari & Koblin, supra note 26 
(suggesting that cord-cutters are instead watching video streaming services such as Netflix); 
Plaugic, supra note 23 (attributing declining movie-theater attendance and revenues to video 
streaming service viewership); Emily Quijano, The Collapse of the Video Rental Industry, 
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The sheer growth and amount of money spent on video streaming services 
are staggering:  more than half of all U.S. homes subscribe to such services, 
which accounts for more than two billion dollars in monthly receipts.29  
These offerings continue to expand as additional competitors enter the 
market.  For example, the Walt Disney Company recently announced its own 
streaming platform that is set to feature premier Disney, Pixar, Marvel, and 
Lucasfilm content.30  With the modern tech disruption of video streaming 
services echoing that of the television just decades ago, a comparison of the 
two is only natural.31 
Video streaming services are often compared to more traditional video 
content providers, such as cable television32 and MVPDs.33  In short, an 
MVPD is an umbrella term that includes more traditional forms of video 
distributors, such as cable and satellite providers.34  The industry is currently 
dominated by the “Core Four” MVPDs, which includes AT&T, Comcast, 
Charter Communications, and Dish Network.35  Because these MVPDs also 
serve as the predominant facilities-based internet service providers, their 
relationship with video streaming services cuts in both directions.  On the 
one hand, as the internet is increasingly used for video streaming, with giants 
such as Netflix accounting for 15 percent of all worldwide downstream 
internet traffic alone, MVPDs stand to gain from more internet customers 
and greater usage.36  On the other hand, this puts MVPDs in direct 
 
MAGNIFICAT (Apr. 2017), https://commons.marymount.edu/magnificat/the-collapse-of-the-
video-rental-industry/ [https://perma.cc/N9PJ-LBBD] (crediting the emergence of digital 
business models for the downfall of the home video rental industry). 
 29. Christine Wang, More Than Half of US Homes Now Subscribe to a Streaming Service, 
Spending $2.1 Billion a Month, CNBC (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/ 
streaming-services-americans-spend-2-point-1-billion-a-month-in-55-percent-homes.html 
[https://perma.cc/C4NE-UZVR]. 
 30. Michelle Castillo, Disney’s New Netflix Rival Will Be Called Disney+ and Launch 
Late 2019, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/disneys-new-netflix-
rival-will-be-called-disney-plus-and-launch-late-2019.html [https://perma.cc/FV3R-GV39]. 
 31. Arne Alsin, The Future of Media:  Disruptions, Revolutions and the Quest for 
Distribution, FORBES (July 19, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aalsin/2018/07/19/the-
future-of-media-disruptions-revolutions-and-the-quest-for-distribution/#4b5b64d260b9 
[https://perma.cc/E4EQ-PLDN]. 
 32. Cable Television, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/ 
media/engineering/cable-television [https://perma.cc/7BUW-J7Y6] (“Cable television is a 
video delivery service provided by a cable operator to subscribers via a coaxial cable or fiber 
optics.”). 
 33. Id. (“A multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) is any person such as, 
but not limited to, a cable operator, a multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct 
broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite program distributor, who 
makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video 
programming.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Mike Farrell, Four for the Money, MULTICHANNEL (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.multichannel.com/news/top-25-mvpds-411157 [https://perma.cc/249F-J6F8].  
Together, these four MVPDs service more than 80 percent of U.S. homes according to a recent 
study. Id. 
 36. SANDVINE, THE GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 7 (2018), 
https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/phenomena/2018-phenomena-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HP7F-HQY4] (determining that Netflix is the largest downstream internet 
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competition with video streaming services, which deliver video 
entertainment of the same look and feel but retain many strategic advantages 
over their MVPD peers.37  Video streaming services, unlike MVPDs, remain 
unregulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and face 
comparatively low economic costs since they do not require costly 
infrastructure investments to deliver their content.38  MVPDs, on the other 
hand, are extensively regulated and bear high costs, though they retain 
benefits not available on video streaming services, like dedicated bandwidth 
(hence, no buffering) and live broadcast television.39 
This widespread shift toward online viewing has prompted MVPDs to 
directly compete with SVODs by making their content available online either 
ancillary to subscribers’ television packages or independently as SVODs 
themselves.40  Moreover, even local broadcasters are attempting to reconcile 
their programming with online viewership trends by making local market 
content streamable.41  Taken together, it should come as no surprise that 
cities are eager to get a bite of the ever-growing apple. 
B.  Tools of Tax Interpretation 
As local governments look to tax video streaming services, the 
interpretation of these tax laws is guided by certain principles.  Part I.B.1 
addresses the substance-over-form doctrine, while Part I.B.2 discusses the 
sliding scale of deference afforded to interpretive rulings of tax 
commissioners. 
1.  The Substance-over-Form Doctrine 
Courts have employed various doctrines to aid in the interpretation and 
application of tax laws to particular transactions.42  One such doctrine is 
known as the substance-over-form doctrine, which allows a court to 
disregard how a tax is labeled and look directly to its substance to determine 
 
application worldwide); Charles R. Naftalin, Video Distribution Competition in the Internet 
Age, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 105, 109–10 (Aspatore 2013); 
Sahil Patel, Why Comcast Argues It’s Not Too Worried About Streaming TV Bundles, DIGIDAY 
(July 26, 2018), https://digiday.com/media/why-comcast-argues-its-not-too-worried-about-
streaming-tv-bundles/ [https://perma.cc/3JE8-DDG7]. 
 37. Naftalin, supra note 36, at 110–11. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Take, for example, AT&T making the same content of its premium network, HBO, 
available in both ways through HBO GO and HBO NOW.  While “HBO GO is a streaming 
service included free with [a user’s] paid HBO subscription through a TV provider[,] HBO 
NOW is a stand-alone streaming service that doesn’t require cable or satellite TV.” What Is 
HBO NOW and How Is It Different from HBO GO?, HBO GO HELP CTR., 
https://help.hbogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204177788-What-is-HBO-NOW-and-how-is-it-
different-from-HBO-GO- [https://perma.cc/DHM4-7A72] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 41. See, e.g., CBS to Launch CBSN Local Streaming Service to Expand Digital Reach, 
CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-to-launch-cbsn-local-
streaming-service-to-expand-digital-reach/ [https://perma.cc/GWW5-6QRE]. 
 42. Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 5 (2000). 
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how a tax should apply under specific facts.43  The doctrine permits courts to 
ignore or controvert the text of tax codes in light of economic principles, the 
taxpayer’s motivation, or a combination of both.44  While the doctrine’s 
applicability may vary from court to court according to the type of transaction 
in question, its use often favors the tax commissioner.45  The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in PPL Corp. v. Commissioner46 demonstrates the 
doctrine in practice. 
In that case, the taxpayer, PPL, challenged the IRS’s denial of tax credits 
for its payment of windfall taxes in the United Kingdom.47  The Internal 
Revenue Code provided for a tax credit on income taxes paid to a foreign 
government,48 and the issue was whether the United Kingdom’s tax on 
windfall profits was considered a foreign income tax for U.S. tax purposes.  
The Court stressed the importance of putting aside labels and definitions to 
assess the tax’s ultimate economic effect.49  Applying the substance-over-
form doctrine,50  the Court held that the tax operated as effectively an income 
tax and thus the taxpayer was entitled to the tax credit.51  Thus, while these 
sorts of tax labels may matter to state or local governments, the Court has 
stressed the importance of looking beyond the labels to assess the true nature 
and effect of a particular tax. 
2.  Deference to Tax Commissioner Rulings 
Another tool of tax interpretation is the deference afforded to 
administrative construction and interpretations of tax codes.52  
 
 43. Under this treatment, a court will look right through the label as if it did not exist. Cf. 
JOHN C. REILLY, Mister Cellophane, on CHICAGO:  MUSIC FROM THE MIRAMAX MOTION 
PICTURE (Epic Records 2002).  The root of this doctrine can be traced back to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  In Gregory, the taxpayer 
engaged in a series of actions for the sole purpose of paying certain taxes at a preferable tax 
rate. Id. at 467.  While the facts fit squarely within the letter of the law as set forth in the tax 
code, the Supreme Court nonetheless ruled against the taxpayer because her conduct was 
plainly outside the intent and purpose of the code in question. Id. at 470. 
 44. Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-Form 
Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 701 (2003).  The substance-over-form 
doctrine is broad and encompasses other related doctrines, such as the sham transaction 
doctrine and other recharacterization doctrines that are applied to cover different factual 
scenarios. See id. at 722–36.  For the purposes of this Note, the substance-over-form doctrine 
will be used broadly as a singular umbrella doctrine rather than distinguishing among the 
smaller subsets and variations of the doctrine. 
 45. See generally Robert Thornton Smith, Substance and Form:  A Taxpayer’s Right to 
Assert the Priority of Substance, 44 TAX LAW. 137 (1990). 
 46. 569 U.S. 329 (2013). 
 47. Id. at 331. 
 48. I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) (2012). 
 49. PPL, 569 U.S. at 335. 
 50. Id. at 340–41 (“[W]e follow substance over form and recognize that the windfall tax 
is nothing more than a tax on actual profits above a threshold.”). 
 51. Id. at 344. 
 52. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron:  Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 
3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996); Jasper L. Cummings Jr., The Supreme Court’s Deference to Tax 
Administrative Interpretation, 69 TAX LAW. 419 (2016); Kristin E. Oglesby, Comment, 
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Administrative deference is often justified as a matter of comparative 
competence53 and political accountability.54  As administered, it is 
effectively the court’s way of saying “I Can’t Do It Alone.”55  Others, 
including Justice Gorsuch, denounce such deference as “judge-made doctrine 
for the abdication of the judicial duty”56 and argue for its curtailment in light 
of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.57  Regardless of one’s 
views, a discussion of deference to federal administrative authorities begins 
with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,58 which 
set out the framework for modern deference,59 and its refinement in United 
States v. Mead Corp.60 
In Mead, the Supreme Court had to determine what deference, if any, 
should apply to a U.S. Customs Service tariff classification.61  The central 
issue became which level of deference to apply:  (1) Chevron deference, 
which the Court found affords a heightened deference to so-called 
“legislative” rulings;62 or (2) Skidmore deference,63 a lesser deference that 
varies based on a variety of factors, which the Court ultimately applied to 
“interpretive” rulings.64  While the legislative-interpretive dichotomy is 
central to the Mead deference analysis, such a distinction may not be as 
pertinent in tax cases.65  The muddiness of the distinction arises largely from 
a 2011 Supreme Court tax case, Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & 
Research v. United States.66  There, the Court dealt with a rule promulgated 
by the Treasury Department and ultimately addressed whether Chevron 
deference would apply based solely upon ambiguity in the statute rather than 
any legislative-interpretive ruling distinction.67 
 
Granting Chevron Deference to IRS Revenue Rulings:  The “Charitable” Thing to Do, 78 LA. 
L. REV. 631 (2017). 
 53. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:  Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). 
 54. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power:  A Response 
to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 397 (1987). 
 55. See CATHERINE ZETA-JONES, I Can’t Do It Alone, on CHICAGO:  MUSIC FROM THE 
MIRAMAX MOTION PICTURE (Epic Records 2002). 
 56. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
 57. Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference:  Doubling Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 552 (2018). 
 58. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 59. Oglesby, supra note 52, at 637. 
 60. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 61. Id. at 221. 
 62. Legislative rulings are afforded heightened deference “when it appears that Congress 
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that 
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.” Id. at 226–27. 
 63. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 64. These factors include the administration’s thoroughness, the validity of its reasoning, 
the consistency of its interpretation over time, and other powers of persuasion. Mead, 533 U.S. 
at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40). 
 65. See Cummings, supra note 52, at 421. 
 66. 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
 67. See generally id. 
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More importantly, the Court’s holding in Mayo put tax cases on par with 
other administrative cases and stressed that in complex areas such as tax, 
agencies “must be able to exercise [their] authority to meet changing 
conditions and new problems.”68  To do so, the Court set aside the oft-cited 
analysis set forth in National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States,69 which 
provided for limited deference in tax cases after satisfying a complex 
multistep framework.70  Thus in the federal tax context, the net effect of 
Mayo collapses these varying deference tests into one sliding-scale approach 
based upon the facts and circumstances,71 sometimes without even resorting 
to Chevron.72 
At the state and local levels, construction and interpretation of tax laws by 
tax agencies are similarly afforded a sliding scale of deference, unless 
inconsistent with their other interpretations or contrary to statutory intent.73  
However, this deference is not absolute:  questions of constitutionality extend 
beyond the scope of a tax authority’s expertise and are thus not entitled to 
deference by courts.74 
C.  Principles of Local Taxation 
Before the previously discussed tools of interpretation can be applied, an 
actual tax must be implemented.  Local governments have a multitude of 
taxing options to collect revenue from video streaming services.  These 
include the sales and use tax, the amusement tax, and the utility or 
telecommunications excise tax.75  One additional option, while not explicitly 
a tax, is a provider fee.  Each of these regimes will be considered in turn.76 
A sales tax is a consumption tax on goods or services, typically levied at 
the point of sale as a percentage of the purchase price.77  A seller typically 
collects and then remits sales taxes to the taxing jurisdiction.78  Sales taxes 
 
 68. Id. at 56 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983)). 
 69. 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 70. Mayo, 562 U.S. at 53–57. 
 71. Cummings, supra note 52, at 423. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See 67B AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 233 (2018). 
 74. See, e.g., Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 905 (Ohio 2016); Zissi v. State 
Tax Comm’n, 842 P.2d 848, 853 n.2 (Utah 1992). 
 75. This Note refers to both “taxes” and “tax bases.”  A tax base includes every activity 
subject to the tax. Tax Base, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  A tax base may be 
expanded without changing the tax law itself.  For example, when Chicago’s amusement tax 
was held to apply to video streaming services, the amusement tax base grew as more activity 
was covered by the tax. See infra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 76. There are other taxes which may be applied to video streaming services, such as the 
property tax and the corporate tax. See M. DAVID GELFAND ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL 
TAXATION AND FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 44–61 (3d ed. 2007).  This Note, however, focuses 
solely on consumption taxes, where users ultimately pay the tax directly or indirectly. 
 77. Id. at 65–66.  Sales taxes are levied in all but five states:  Alaska, Delaware, Montana, 
New Hampshire, and Oregon. See JARED WALCZAK & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., STATE 
AND LOCAL SALES TAX RATES IN 2017, at 2 (2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/ 
20170131121743/TaxFoundation-FF539.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4W9-UC5Z].  Alaska and 
Montana do not levy sales taxes, but their municipalities may. See id. 
 78. See GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 66–67. 
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are typically lumped together with use taxes, which are levied at the same 
rate, because use taxes operate effectively as a proxy for the sales tax on 
purchases made outside of a consumer’s jurisdiction of residence.79  The use 
tax applies to goods or services that are purchased outside the taxing 
jurisdiction but stored or consumed within it.80  Use taxes are due within the 
taxing jurisdiction if the purchase would have been subject to sales tax if 
purchased there and if sales tax was not collected where the purchase was 
made.81  To illustrate, take a resident of Dallas who purchases a car in 
Cleveland for storage and use in Dallas.  If Cleveland did not collect sales 
tax on the purchase, but Dallas would have, then the resident owes use tax in 
Dallas. 
The liability for these taxes typically falls on the consumer, who is 
ultimately liable if the seller does not collect a sales tax on the transaction.82  
However, whether or not a seller is required to collect taxes is a separate 
question.  If a sale occurs in a jurisdiction which levies a sales tax on a 
particular good or service, the provider of the good or service must collect 
and remit the sales tax to the jurisdiction only if it established a substantial 
nexus with the taxing jurisdiction.83 
The amusement tax is effectively a specialized sales tax on admission to 
places of entertainment and is levied as a percentage of the admission price, 
often at the same rate as the jurisdiction’s sales tax.84  While calculated in 
the same manner as a sales tax, the amusement tax forms an independent tax 
base.85  Given its specialized nature, the amusement tax faces a lesser 
procedural burden than the general sales tax:  while a local government’s 
sales tax often requires specific state legislative authorization, an amusement 
tax typically does not.86  However, while most cities have a sales tax, fewer 
have an amusement tax, and even those cities that do differ in what qualifies 
as a taxable amusement.  For example, while Philadelphia and Santa Cruz 
 
 79. Id. at 80–81.  But see McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (positing 
that while sales and use taxes often “bring about the same result,” they are conceptually 
different and may require different constitutional justifications). 
 80. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 80–81. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 67, 81; see also I Bought a Taxable Item and the Seller Didn’t Charge Sales 
Tax.  Do I Have to Pay the Tax Anyway?, SALES TAX INST., https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/ 
sales_tax_faqs/i-bought-a-taxable-item-and-the-seller-didnt-charge-sales-tax-do-i-have-to-
pay-the-tax-anyway [https://perma.cc/G3KF-2RY9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 83. How Do I Know if I Should Be Collecting Tax in a State?, SALES TAX INST., 
https://www.salestaxinstitute.com/Sales_Tax_FAQs/should_I_collect_tax [https://perma.cc/ 
UF97-KPA5] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).  For a discussion of what constitutes a substantial 
nexus for the purposes of internet taxation, see infra Part II.C.2. 
 84. Amusement Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also GELFAND ET 
AL., supra note 76, at 91. 
 85. As such, it has been suggested that the amusement tax may skirt the confines of the 
substantial-nexus requirement. See, e.g., William L. Fletcher Jr., Note, Netflix and Quill:  
Using Access and Consumption to Create a Plan for Taxing the Cloud, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1029, 1031 n.3 (2017); infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the substantial-nexus requirement in 
detail). 
 86. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 91.  The amusement tax also may avoid a vote of 
local residents. Id. 
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tax admissions to movie theaters, New York City exempts them from its 
amusement tax.87 
The excise tax is related to the sales tax, as it operates effectively as a 
specialized sales tax on particular goods or services.88  However, the excise 
tax differs from the general sales tax in three important ways.  First, the 
provider of a good or service is responsible for paying the excise tax.89  While 
consumers are mostly unaware of the tax, providers often pass the cost onto 
the consumer by including it in the price.90  However, the provider remains 
ultimately liable.91  Second, the excise tax is highly specific and traditionally 
applies only to transactions that have high social costs, such as gasoline, 
cigarettes, and alcohol.92  Third, excise taxes tend to be levied as flat taxes 
assessed on a flat or per-unit basis rather than as a percentage rate applied to 
a transaction.93  For example, New York State levies a roughly four dollar 
tax on a pack of cigarettes, which remains constant whether the price 
increases or decreases.94 
The dividing line between excise and sales taxes may sometimes be 
blurred because the last two distinguishing characteristics do not always 
exist.  The excise tax sometimes applies to goods or services that do not 
necessarily have high social costs and may apply on a percentage basis, as is 
the case with taxes on utilities such as telecommunications services.95 
An additional quasi-tax option is the fee, which operates effectively as a 
narrowly tailored tax that covers the costs of a specific government program 
or service.96  Local governments often prefer fees to taxes for various 
 
 87. Compare Amusement Tax, CITY PHILA. https://www.phila.gov/services/payments-
assistance-taxes/business-taxes/amusement-tax/ [https://perma.cc/R3W5-3UAC] (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2019), and Admission Tax, CITY SANTA CRUZ, http://www.cityofsantacruz.com/ 
government/city-departments/finance/licenses-fees-and-taxes/admission-tax [http://perma.cc/ 
Z2PC-QDPN] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019), with N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., 
TB-ST-8, ADMISSION CHARGES TO A PLACE OF AMUSEMENT 2 (2014), https://www.tax.ny.gov/ 
pdf/tg_bulletins/sales/b14_8s.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE25-3XLX].  New York City follows 
New York State’s tax policy on amusement. See New York State Sales and Use Tax, 
N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/business-nys-sales-tax.page 
[http://perma.cc/Q5H8-7FHF] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 88. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 85. 
 89. See Dan Caplinger, What Is Excise Tax, and Do I Have to Pay It?, MOTLEY FOOL 
(Dec. 17, 2016), https://www.fool.com/retirement/2016/12/17/what-is-excise-tax-and-do-i-
have-to-pay-it.aspx [https://perma.cc/WP2S-74Z6]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Public Utility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A company that 
provides necessary services to the public, such as telephone lines and service, electricity, and 
water.  Most utilities operate as monopolies but are subject to governmental regulation.”).  For 
example, New York State imposes an excise tax on telecommunications services at a rate of 
2.5 percent. N.Y. TAX LAW § 186-e(2)(a)(1) (2019). 
 96. GELFAND ET AL., supra note 76, at 98–100; see also Rebecca Helmes, Extras on 
Excise:  The Difference Between a ‘Tax’ and ‘Fee’ and Why It Matters, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.bna.com/extras-excise-difference-b17179894455/ 
[https://perma.cc/P9BK-UYP7]. 
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reasons.  First, fees are easier to pass and amend from a procedural standpoint 
because they are not usually subject to voter approval or supermajority 
requirements.97  Second, fees are subject to a lesser level of constitutional 
review because they are designed to cover the government’s costs of 
providing specific services under its regulatory powers, not to raise revenue 
under commerce powers.98  As such, a fee need not meet the constitutional 
substantial-nexus requirement imposed on taxes.99  Third, fees are often 
considered more palatable than taxes because of their restitutionary nature.100  
Thus, whether a charge constitutes a fee or a tax is murky but of great 
significance to local governments. 
For example, in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson,101 the Fourth Circuit held that 
North Carolina’s franchise charges levied on cable providers constituted 
taxes as opposed to fees.102  In assessing whether the government-imposed 
charge was a tax or a fee, the court looked at three factors:  (1) who imposed 
the charge, (2) who is subject to the charge, and (3) how the collected monies 
are used.103  When the charge falls roughly between a fee and a tax, the court 
held that the primary factor is how the money is used.104  In that case, all 
three factors favored classification as a tax because the charges were not 
imposed by administrative or regulatory agencies, the charges were not 
narrowly targeted at certain users or providers, and the monies raised were 
not discretely used to cover the costs of the specific government service for 
which they were levied.105 
II.  ACT TWO:  LOCAL TAXATION OF VIDEO STREAMING SERVICES: 
CURRENT APPROACHES AND CONSTRAINTS 
There is a growing disparity between the methods by which local 
governments tax video streaming services, if they do so at all.  In general, 
these various tax schemes fit roughly into two categories:  (1) those that tax 
video streaming services independently from MVPDs, and (2) those that tax 
them in line with MVPDs.  Part II.A considers the former, while Part II.B 
considers the latter.  Part II.C concludes with an analysis of the “macro” 
constraints that may inhibit local cities from taxing local video streaming 
services, including constraints created by the states, the Supreme Court, and 
Congress. 
 
 97. See Helmes, supra note 96. 
 98. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tolson, 513 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2008).  The fee-tax 
distinction is critical for constitutional review.  Taxes, unlike fees, are subject to rigorous 
constitutional review in light of dormant Commerce Clause concerns. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 99. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 100. See David Segal, Cities Turn to Fees to Fill Budget Gaps, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/business/11fees.html [https://perma.cc/2HEU-H56N]. 
 101. 513 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 102. Id. at 125. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 125–26. 
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A.  Tax Approaches That Are Distinct from MVPD Taxation 
As discussed in Part I.C, local governments have various taxing 
approaches available to them.  This Part considers two particular case studies 
where video streaming services are taxed independently of MVPDs:  
(1) Pennsylvania’s sales and use tax, and (2) Chicago’s amusement tax. 
1.  Pennsylvania’s Sales and Use Tax 
In 2016, Pennsylvania modernized its tax code to extend the state’s 
6 percent sales and use tax to “digital products delivered to a customer 
electronically, digitally or by streaming.”106  The Pennsylvania Department 
of Revenue specifically states that these digital products include TVODs107 
and SVODs.108  The seller must collect and remit the tax if the consumer’s 
billing address is in Pennsylvania, irrespective of where the actual video is 
viewed.109  While noteworthy within the state, this sort of tax is far from 
revolutionary, with calls for such modernization dating back to 2013110 and 
similar implementation, for example, taking place in Washington State in 
2009.111 
The approach, however, is not without its drawbacks.  One issue is that 
many local governments exempt services from their sales tax largely due to 
historical accident.112  When sales taxes were first implemented during the 
Great Depression, the economy was largely goods-based.113  Currently, 
many statutes still exempt services because they fall outside these taxing 
statutes, which are difficult to amend from a political perspective given fears 
of regressivity.114  Some states attempt to circumvent this issue by treating 
video streaming services as if they were digital goods rather than services, 
though only twenty-seven states taxed digital goods as of December 1, 
2017.115  That group is actually even smaller because several of these states 
 
 106. Digital Products, PA. DEP’T REVENUE, https://www.revenue.pa.gov/General 
TaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Information/SUT/Pages/Digital-Products.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/R6F3-QR6X] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 107. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 109. Digital Products, supra note 106. 
 110. See generally MICHAEL LEACHMAN & MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, FOUR STEPS TO MOVING STATE SALES TAXES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY (2013), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-9-13sfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z7D-
W9HA]. 
 111. Digital Products Including Digital Goods, WASH. DEP’T REVENUE (May 19, 2009), 
https://dor.wa.gov/get-form-or-publication/publications-subject/tax-topics/digital-products-
including-digital-goods [https://perma.cc/P8SB-QFZM]. 
 112. NICOLE KAEDING, TAX FOUND., SALES TAX BASE BROADENING:  RIGHT-SIZING A 
STATE SALES TAX 6 (2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171026101536/Tax-Foundation-
FF563.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D67-555K]. 
 113. See id. at 3. 
 114. See id. at 6. 
 115. See 2018 STATE TAX HANDBOOK 852–54 (Cathleen Calhoun et al. eds., 2017). 
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tax only permanent digital video downloads and specifically exempt video 
streaming services.116 
2.  Chicago’s Amusement Tax 
The City of Chicago took a different approach by levying an amusement 
tax on video streaming services, which it accomplished through a revenue 
ruling on a previously enacted municipal amusement tax.117  The term 
“amusement” is construed broadly to encompass a wide range of activities.118  
For example, the statute includes, but is not limited to, theatrical 
performances, motion pictures, circuses, carnivals, and athletic events.119  
While the tax is imposed upon the “patrons of every amusement within the 
City,” providers are jointly and severally liable for the tax imposed.120 
Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, through his spokesperson Elizabeth 
Langsdorf, argued that “[i]n an environment in which technologies and 
emerging industries evolve quickly, the City periodically issues rulings that 
clarify the application of existing laws to these technologies and 
industries.”121  Beyond providing clearer guidance, such a ruling, according 
to Alderman Ameya Pawar, would promote fairness by correcting the tax 
loophole that allowed online businesses to skirt the tax code to better 
“reflect[] the realities of the marketplace.”122 
Accordingly, on June 9, 2015, Chicago’s Comptroller issued Amusement 
Tax Ruling #5, which interpreted Chicago’s amusement tax to include 
“charges paid for the privilege to witness, view or participate in amusements 
that are delivered electronically.”123  More specifically, the ruling expands 
the amusement tax to cover charges for video streaming services provided to 
 
 116. Compare Digital Products, supra note 106 (including video streaming in the 
Pennsylvania digital goods tax), and Digital Products Including Digital Goods, supra note 
111 (including video streaming in the Washington digital goods tax), with IDAHO CODE § 63-
3616(b) (2018) (excluding video streaming from the Idaho digital goods tax), and IND. CODE 
§ 6-2.5-4-16.4 (2018) (excluding video streaming from the Indiana digital goods tax). 
 117. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-020 (2018) (imposing a 9 percent tax on “the 
admission fees or other charges paid for the privilege to enter, to witness, to view or to 
participate in such amusement”). 
 118. In the tax commissioner’s interpretive ruling, the broadness is underscored by adding 
emphasis to highlight that “amusement” includes “any exhibition, performance, presentation 
or show for entertainment purposes . . . any entertainment or recreational activity offered for 
public participation or on a membership or other basis . . . or . . . any paid television 
programming.” City of Chi. Dep’t of Fin., Amusement Tax Ruling #5 para. 2 (June 9, 2015) 
(quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 4-156-020). 
 119. Id. 
 120. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 4-156-020 to -030(A). 
 121. John Byrne & Amina Elahi, Chicago Extends Taxing Power to Online Movies, Music, 
More, CHI. TRIB. (July 5, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
chicago-cloud-tax-met-0702-20150701-story.html [https://perma.cc/944R-MB6A]. 
 122. Id. 
 123. City of Chi. Dep’t of Fin., Amusement Tax Ruling #5 para. 8 (June 9, 2015) (emphasis 
added). 
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Chicago consumers as determined by their primary residential or business 
address.124 
Responding to this ruling, the Liberty Justice Center, a libertarian think 
tank, challenged the extension of the amusement tax on behalf of a group of 
Chicago internet consumers in Labell.  The plaintiffs focused on three 
grounds:  (1) a violation of the ITFA, (2) a violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, and (3) a violation of the city’s power under Illinois’s 
home-rule provision.125 
First, as to the ITFA issue,126 the plaintiffs challenged the new 
interpretation of the amusement tax as discriminatory.127  In their view, the 
tax was discriminatory because similar noninternet entertainment was subject 
to unequal taxation, including flat yearly taxes on automatic amusement 
machines and lower rates for live performances in small venues.128  The court 
disagreed and found real and substantial differences between in-person 
entertainment and streaming entertainment and, thus, found no violation of 
the ITFA.129 
Second, as to the dormant Commerce Clause issue,130 the plaintiffs 
challenged the tax’s application to streaming services used outside of 
Chicago because they lacked a substantial nexus to the City and were unfairly 
apportioned.131  The court again disagreed on both accounts.132  First, the 
court found that the tax did possess a substantial nexus to Chicago because it 
applied only to those who receive their streaming services in Chicago based 
upon a “fair assumption that the taxpayers’ residence will be their primary 
places of streaming.”133  Second, the court found that it was fairly 
apportioned and externally consistent based on this same assumption:  using 
the customer’s billing address as the basis for taxation is a “practical solution 
to the technology of the 21st century,”134 and the limited possibility of 
multiple taxation was insufficient to invalidate the tax ruling.135 
 
 124. Id. paras. 8(a), 13.  The tax does not apply to permanent digital sales of TV or movies, 
which are treated separately under the general sales tax base. Id. paras. 10–11. 
 125. Labell v. City of Chicago, No. 15 CH 13399, 2018 BL 212206, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 
24, 2018).  The plaintiffs also challenged the extension as a violation of the Illinois state 
constitution, but this Note does not address that portion. Id. 
 126. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 127. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *2. 
 128. Id. at *2–3. 
 129. Id.  The court distinguished video streaming on one’s personal device as “not in any 
way similar” to live performances, which foster tourism and business and cultivate the fine 
arts. Id. at *3.  The court then distinguished video streaming from automatic amusement 
machines, which are operated on a coin-per-use basis on shared devices owned by an 
establishment and to which per-transaction taxation would be administratively inconvenient. 
Id. 
 130. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 131. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *4. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at *5. 
 134. Id. at *6. 
 135. Id. at *5–6. 
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Third, as to the home-rule issue,136 the plaintiffs claimed that Chicago 
exceeded its home-rule powers by taxing streaming services beyond its 
borders and therefore beyond the scope of its taxing authority.137  The court 
yet again disagreed, siding with the City on various grounds.  First, the court 
reasoned that the state’s home-rule powers are to be construed liberally to 
give municipalities, such as Chicago, wide latitude to tax absent an express 
state legislative statement to the contrary.138  Second, the court found even 
greater support for such taxing power given that Illinois adopted the Mobile 
Telecommunications Sourcing Act (MTSA).139  Passed by Congress in 2002, 
the MTSA enables state and local taxation of mobile telecommunications 
services at the customer’s “place of primary use” regardless of where the 
services are actually used.140  While the MTSA is silent with respect to 
streaming services provided by non-telecommunications companies, the 
court found that using a customer’s billing address as the basis of the tax was 
reasonable because the MTSA would permit it if the streaming services were 
instead provided by telecommunications companies.141  Lastly, the court 
reiterated that municipal ordinances such as this are presumed constitutional 
and will be upheld absent a successful facial or as-applied challenge.142  In 
sum, the court likened the tax to the Chicago vehicle sticker tax, which is 
based upon the driver’s billing address even if the vehicle is driven outside 
of the city.143  Likewise, a streaming service consumer who lives in Chicago 
is liable for the tax even if the streaming takes place outside of the city.144 
Though Chicago prevailed on summary judgment, Amusement Tax 
Ruling #5 is far from settled law.  On the one hand, a similar challenge 
brought by the Entertainment Software Association was voluntarily 
dismissed, which suggests that challengers may be conceding the validity of 
Labell’s reasoning.145  On the other, Labell is on appeal146 and Apple has 
filed a similar lawsuit against Chicago on the same three grounds.147  For 
 
 136. A home-rule provision is a state legislature’s conditional allocation of autonomy to a 
local government. Home Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also infra Part 
II.C.1. 
 137. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *8. 
 138. Id. at *9–10; see also ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a), (m); Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive 
Condo. Ass’n, 988 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ill. 2013). 
 139. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *9–10. 
 140. Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 117(b), 124(8) (2012). 
 141. Labell, 2018 BL 212206, at *10. 
 142. Id. at *11 (citing City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enters., 865 N.E.2d 133, 146 (Ill. 
2006)). 
 143. Id. at *12. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Michael J. Bologna, Chicago’s ‘Netflix Tax’ OK, but Appeal in Queue, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (May 29, 2018), https://www.bna.com/chicagos-netflix-tax-n57982093026/ 
[https://perma.cc/86ZJ-T37G]. 
 146. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 147. See generally Apple Complaint, supra note 9.  The complaint notably differs from the 
one filed in Labell as it comes from the perspective of an out-of-state provider rather than that 
of a consumer subject to the tax.  The complaint highlights the “significant administrative 
burden” of the amusement tax’s collection and remission and the unfairness of being held 
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now, the amusement tax remains in effect and all remote sellers are 
responsible for collecting and remitting as of October 1, 2018.148 
B.  Tax Approaches That Are Consistent with MVPD Taxation 
Another approach taken by local governments is to tax video streaming 
services in line with how MVPDs are taxed.  As discussed in Part I.A, video 
streaming services and MVPDs compete with each other.149  Whether video 
streaming services fall into the category of MVPDs may have massive tax 
implications—telecommunications services, such as MVPDs, are the most 
heavily transaction-taxed services in the United States, subject to roughly 14 
percent taxes on average as opposed to the 6 percent average for other 
services.150 
Recognizing the convergence of video streaming services and MVPDs,151 
in 2015 the FCC proposed a rule that would have redefined MVPDs to 
include at least some video streaming services, which would make these 
approaches easier.152  The agency justified this proposal as a modernization 
of its regulations to (1) recognize the trend of video services increasingly 
accessed on the internet, and (2) benefit consumers by stimulating innovation 
and competition.153  The FCC’s current chair, Ajit Pai, served as a 
commissioner when the change was proposed154 and expressed his 
opposition on multiple occasions—gently at first,155 and then more sharply 
by cautioning against opening a Pandora’s box of video streaming 
 
directly liable for Chicago residents’ tax liability if it fails to collect and remit the taxes 
accordingly. Id. paras. 38–40. 
 148. See Tripp Baltz, State of Wayfair:  Illinois ‘Amorphous,’ Attempting to Streamline, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bna.com/state-wayfair-illinois-n730144 
82728/ [https://perma.cc/4SPQ-WMTH]. 
 149. See supra Part I.A. 
 150. JOE CARR ET AL., DELOITTE, UNDERSTANDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAXATION 8–9 
(2015), https://telestrategies.com/tax/Presentations2015/Wednesday/Deloitte%20101%20 
PAPER%20May-15_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDR4-Z4ZW].  See generally Note, 
Taxation of Cable Television:  First Amendment Limitations, 109 HARV. L. REV. 440 (1995) 
(discussing the differential taxation of cable television and its resulting greater tax burden to 
consumers). 
 151. See supra Part I.A. 
 152. This would be done “by including [within the FCC definition of MVPDs] services that 
make available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple linear streams of video 
programming, regardless of the technology used to distribute the programming.” Promoting 
Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video Programming 
Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 2078 (proposed Jan. 15, 2015). 
 153. Id. at 2079. 
 154. Ajit Pai:  FCC Chairman, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/about/ 
leadership/ajit-pai [https://perma.cc/WG24-8CM9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
 155. “[G]iven the dramatic, organic explosion in online video content over the last few 
years, I have my doubts as to whether additional regulation in this space is necessary.” Ajit 
Pai, Comm’r, FCC, Concurring Statement on Promoting Innovation and Competition in the 
Provision of Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services (Dec. 19, 2014), 
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001010395.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4JZ-X4KA]. 
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regulation.156  Accordingly, the change never occurred and thus video 
streaming services remain unregulated as distinct from their MVPD peers.157 
Nevertheless, as a matter of apparent equity, or of convenience, 
governments continue to attempt such taxation, and while these regulatory 
issues may seem distinct from the tax considerations at the core of this Note, 
the differing regulatory treatment does have relevant downstream effects on 
such attempts.  By maintaining such definitional distinctions, state and local 
governments that seek to conveniently tax video streaming services in line 
with existing MVPD tax laws might not be able to do so.158 
For example, in Netflix, Inc. v. Finance & Administration Cabinet 
Department of Revenue, Netflix sought to avoid paying Kentucky state taxes 
by relying upon the FCC’s definitions to distinguish it from classification as 
an MVPD or cable service under the state’s telecommunications tax.159  The 
court noted that “[w]hen a Kentucky statute is modeled after a federal 
counterpart statute, the Kentucky courts state that they ‘must consider the 
way the federal act has been interpreted.’”160  The core of Netflix’s argument 
was the distinct treatment of video streaming services apart from MVPDs 
under FCC regulations, which suggests that these federal definitions still 
matter greatly even as applied to state or local tax statutes.161 
Of course, state and local governments could circumvent the issue by 
altering the definitions of MVPDs in their respective telecommunications 
statutes, though they have had varied success in doing so.  While states such 
as Florida162 and South Carolina163 have successfully subjected video 
streaming services to their telecommunications taxes, other attempts have 
floundered, become the subject of ongoing litigation, or been abandoned. 
Netflix illustrates one such failed attempt.  The Kentucky legislature 
defined MVPDs more broadly than the FCC’s definition,164 and the court 
 
 156. Ajit Pai, Comm’r, FCC, Remarks Before the Churchill Club (July 17, 2015), 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-334437A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SRD-G577]. 
 157. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
 159. Netflix, Inc. v. Fin. & Admin. Cabinet Dep’t of Revenue, No. K-24900, 2015 WL 
5692791, at *1–2 (Ky. B.T.A. Sept. 23, 2015). 
 160. Id. at *2 (quoting Harker v. Fed. Land Bank, 679 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1984)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. “‘Video service’ means the transmission of video, audio, or other programming 
service to a purchaser, and . . . includes . . . digital video.” FLA. STAT. § 14-202.11(24) (2018).  
This is in stark contrast to Florida’s earlier definition of “video services” which explicitly 
exempted video streaming services from telecommunications tax treatment. FLA. STAT. § 36-
610.103(11) (2018) (stating that a video service does not include “video programming 
provided as part of and via a service that enables end users to access content, information, 
electronic mail, or other services offered over the public Internet”). 
 163. “The streaming transmission of television programs, movies and music using the 
Internet is no different from cable and satellite transmission of television programs, movies 
music, and other similar content, all of which are taxable communications services.” S.C. 
Dep’t of Revenue, S.C. Revenue Ruling #16-5, at 5 (July 6, 2016) (interpreting S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 12-36-910(B)(3)). 
 164. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  Kentucky, on the other hand, defines 
an MVPD as “programming provided by or generally considered comparable to programming 
provided by a television broadcast station and shall include but not be limited to:  (a) Cable 
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was thus faced with a taxation statute similar to, but distinct from, the FCC’s 
definition.165  The court reasoned that even if Netflix would avoid state 
taxation under the FCC definition of an MVPD, it could still be taxed under 
the Kentucky statute’s definition if it so provided.166  The court compared 
the statutory language to that of Florida’s communications tax,167 where the 
statute explicitly covers digital video streaming.  Absent such clear language 
in the statute, the court instead had to determine whether a video streaming 
service such as Netflix was generally comparable to a MVPD.168  While the 
court noted that both provide video content to consumers, a video streaming 
service is effectively comparable only to the on-demand portion of an 
MVPD, which was insufficient to render it generally comparable on the 
whole.169  Rather, the court found them to be quite different, since video 
streaming services do not provide live programming or scheduled linear 
programming.170  Because Netflix did not fit within the letter of the law and 
was not generally comparable to MVPDs, the court held it was not subject to 
the tax.171 
Various municipalities across Missouri are currently entangled in litigation 
regarding their attempts to charge video streaming services as MVPDs, albeit 
through a provider fee rather than through a tax.172  In 2007, Missouri passed 
the Video Services Providers Act (VSPA), which paved the way for 
municipalities to collect fees from providers of video services.173  Pursuant 
to this statute, municipalities such as Creve Coeur have collected 5 percent 
fees from cable providers and the like, and have since sought a declaratory 
judgment that video streaming services such as Netflix and Hulu are subject 
to this same fee.174  The class action lawsuit, brought on behalf of all 
similarly situated municipalities in Missouri, alleges that Netflix fits within 
the VSPA’s definition of a video service provider175 because its video 
content is delivered over broadband internet connection, a public right-of-
way, within the state.176  Netflix argues that it is not generally comparable to 
 
service; (b) Satellite broadcast and wireless cable service; and (c) Internet protocol television 
provided through wireline facilities without regard to delivery technology.” KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 136.602(8) (West 2018). 
 165. Netflix, 2015 WL 5692791, at *1. 
 166. “The Board concludes that if [video] streaming services fit within the Kentucky 
statute’s definition for ‘multichannel video programming,’ then Netflix would be a provider 
of ‘multichannel video programming services’ for purposes of Kentucky tax law, regardless 
of its status under federal law for regulatory purposes.” Id. at *3. 
 167. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 168. Netflix, 2015 WL 5692791, at *3. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at *3–4. 
 171. Id. at *6. 
 172. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text. 
 173. MO. REV. STAT. § 67.2689 (2018). 
 174. See generally Creve Coeur Petition, supra note 9. 
 175. Video services are defined as “the provision of video programming provided through 
wireline facilities located at least in part in the public right-of-way without regard to delivery 
technology, including internet protocol technology whether provided as part of a tier, on 
demand, or a per-channel basis.” MO. REV. STAT. § 67.2677(14) (2018). 
 176. Creve Coeur Petition, supra note 9, para. 35. 
2019] SAVED BY LABELL 1633 
those providers subject to the fee, relying on both the Kentucky Netflix 
case177 and federal telecommunications law.178  The case remains undecided 
as of the publication of this Note. 
Other attempts, while not the subject of litigation, have been sharply 
criticized and abandoned.  Across California, Pasadena and forty-five other 
cities have considered issuing interpretive rulings to include video streaming 
services in their utility tax bases.179  This would make these services, like 
their MVPD counterparts, subject to taxes ranging anywhere from 4 to 10 
percent.180  While smaller municipalities did so, Pasadena suspended their 
efforts following substantial pushback from certain lawmakers.181 
C.  Key Constraints on Local Taxation 
This Part outlines the potential roadblocks to the local taxation of video 
streaming services posed by the states, the Supreme Court, and Congress.  
Part II.C.1 describes home-rule provisions and state restrictions on local tax 
discretion.  Part II.C.2 discusses the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence and how it impacts internet taxation.  Part II.C.3 then 
addresses congressional limitations on internet taxation as provided for in the 
ITFA. 
1.  The States:  Home-Rule Provisions 
Even if a city wanted to tax video streaming services as discussed in Part 
II.A and Part II.B, cities “often lack the legal authority to enact meaningful 
tax reform.”182  Because cities are technically “creatures of the state,” their 
powers are typically constrained by what a state will allow, which varies from 
state to state.183  Many states have responded by enacting home-rule 
provisions as a means of devolution to allow cities greater authority to tackle 
certain problems.184  While a number of states explicitly give their local 
 
 177. See supra notes 159–71 and accompanying text. 
 178. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Netflix, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 8–9, City of Creve Coeur v. Netflix, No. 4:18-cv-01495 
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 13, 2018), ECF No. 10 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 522(20)). 
 179. Utility taxes are merely excise taxes on utilities. See supra note 95 and accompanying 
text. 
 180. Jason Henry, Pasadena Will Tax Netflix, Hulu and Your City Might Be Next, 
PASADENA STAR-NEWS (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.pasadenastarnews.com/2016/ 
09/23/pasadena-will-tax-netflix-hulu-and-your-city-might-be-next/ [https://perma.cc/MK4S-
UN6T]. 
 181. MICHAEL J. CATALDO, PILLSBURY, CALIFORNIA CITIES TO TAX STREAMING VIDEO? 3 
n.9 (2016), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/1/0/v2/104731/AlertDec2016Tax 
UtilityUserTaxonStreamingVideo.pdf [https://perma.cc/A43X-ZMUL]; see also Janko 
Roettgers, California Bill Aims to Stop Local Netflix Tax Ordinances, VARIETY 
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/netflix-tax-stream-act-1201984291/ 
[https://perma.cc/M38M-EPJB]. 
 182. Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?:  Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and 
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296 (2016). 
 183. Id. at 301. 
 184. Id. at 302.  Types of home-rule authority include structural, personnel, functional, and 
fiscal, according to the National League of Cities. Id. at 301–02. 
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governments fiscal control, including tax discretion, these local governments 
may still be constrained by state constitutional provisions.185 
Home-rule provisions vary widely depending upon how much deference a 
state is willing to offer its localities.  For example, one recent article 
compared home-rule provisions from three states—Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Ohio—to demonstrate the disparity among home-rule provisions.186  
While Washington and Wisconsin offer limited taxing power to their local 
governments, Ohio offers its local governments general presumptive taxing 
authority.187  Whether or not local governments should be given greater 
leeway to experiment with taxation is a contested question with principled 
justifications on both sides of the debate.188 
Proponents of greater local tax discretion cite multiple reasons, principally 
the potential for greater policy innovation at the local level.189  Confronted 
with declining revenues and limited state aid, greater tax innovation at the 
local level would discourage municipal borrowing and empower local 
leaders to raise sufficient funds to meet their spending needs.190  Moreover, 
local governments are uniquely situated to serve as laboratories of democracy 
where the stakes are comparatively lower than they are at the state or federal 
level.191  In the context of such a multitude of localities—over 3000 counties 
and 15,000 municipalities—greater tax discretion would allow seemingly 
endless “opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and reform.”192 
In fact, several now-national fiscal policy proposals were incubated at the 
local level, such as the Fight for $15 movement to address issues of low-
wage work.193  After just five local governments had minimum wage laws in 
place in 2012, more than forty local governments joined the Fight for $15 
movement and implemented such laws as of June 2018.194  The Fight for $15 
 
 185. Id. at 302–03. 
 186. Id. at 305–13. 
 187. Id. at 312. 
 188. See id. at 316–34.  As a proponent of expanded home-rule authority, Scharff calls for 
presumptive municipal taxing authority. Id. at 298. 
 189. Id. at 316–17.  Other reasons include less distortion of city-development choices, 
greater lines of accountability, and increased regulatory choices. Id. at 312. 
 190. Id. at 316–17. 
 191. Id. at 316. 
 192. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 259 
(2004). 
 193. See Steven Greenhouse, How to Get Low-Wage Workers into the Middle Class, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/fifteen-
dollars-minimum-wage/401540/ [https://perma.cc/B9EL-NRYL] (discussing the history of 
the Fight for $15 movement). 
 194. Inventory of US City and County Minimum Wage Ordinances, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. 
CTR. (June 20, 2018), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/minimum-wage-living-wage-resources/ 
inventory-of-us-city-and-county-minimum-wage-ordinances/ [https://perma.cc/U3S6-ZLP9].  
These changes have upstream effects on states as well.  Take California for example.  After 
cities such as Los Angeles and San Francisco experimented with fiscal policy and raised their 
local minimum wages to fifteen dollars, the State of California followed shortly thereafter and 
pledged to raise the state’s minimum wage to fifteen dollars as well.  The state wage increases 
trail those at the local level and allow the state to maneuver away from the policy should the 
effects at the local level be suboptimal. See Paul Davidson, California Reaches Deal on $15 
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has since continued up the state level to become a centerpiece of the 
Democrats’ national fiscal platform.195  This bottom-up policy building is 
not a strange phenomenon by any stretch, as there are countless other 
examples, including the national drinking age, the national speed limit, and 
Common Core educational standards.196 
However, not everyone agrees that local governments should be given 
greater tax discretion.  From the states’ perspective, tight fiscal control over 
localities may help mitigate vertical tax competition, horizontal tax 
competition, concerns of ultimate fiscal responsibility, and administrability 
concerns.197  Vertical tax competition is a concern for states because 
municipal taxation may compete directly with the state’s taxation.198  
Horizontal tax competition is also a concern for states because intrastate 
competition between municipalities may set off a race for the lowest taxes.199  
This would hurt, rather than help, municipalities and could potentially force 
them to cut spending or increase their dependence on state aid.200  A third 
concern that states may have relates to the perception that they bear ultimate 
fiscal responsibility:  state leaders fear that local fiscal distress might ripple 
elsewhere, perhaps even upstream to the state level.201 
The final concern relates to administrability and requires a deeper dive.202  
While states themselves often lack sufficient resources to support their own 
tax administration, local governments are even less sophisticated and have 
even fewer resources.203  Thus, to protect multijurisdictional taxpayers and 
create greater efficiencies, a state may be inclined to restrict local tax 
 
Minimum Wage, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/ 
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 195. Jordain Carney, Sanders, Democrats Introduce $15 Minimum Wage Bill, HILL (May 
27, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/335227-sanders-democrats-introduce-
15-minimum-wage-bill [https://perma.cc/XTS7-6QDK]; see also Ivan Levingston, Sanders 
Wins $15 Minimum Wage in Dems Platform Draft, CNBC (July 1, 2016, 6:19 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/01/sanders-wins-15-minimum-wage-in-dems-platform-
draft.html [https://perma.cc/F2E9-4KXN]. 
 196. Tom Loveless, When Does a Policy Start?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/when-does-a-policy-start/ [https://perma.cc/C4DM-
K4YN]. 
 197. Scharff, supra note 182, at 321. 
 198. Id. at 321–22.  While this may not be a problem where demand is inelastic, vertical 
tax competition may create an issue where the demand is elastic.  For example, assume a 
municipality adds a tax on video streaming services, which are elastic.  When consumers no 
longer purchase them, they reduce not only the municipality’s tax revenue but the state’s, 
assuming they tax the same service. Id. 
 199. Id. at 324–26.  This horizontal competition can occur, for example, by offering tax 
incentives to businesses to locate in a particular place or by offering lower sales tax rates to 
residents. Id. 
 200. Id. at 326. 
 201. Id. at 326–30. 
 202. See id. at 330–34. 
 203. See id. at 331. 
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discretion to minimize differences in tax rates and bases among 
municipalities.204  Some states have gone even further by not only requiring 
uniformity across local governments but by bringing themselves into 
uniformity with other states through the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement (SSUTA).205 
The SSUTA is a product of multistate cooperation to reduce tax 
administration and compliance costs.206  Since its inception in 1999,207 the 
SSUTA has grown to include twenty-four states and encompasses 33 percent 
of the national population.208  The SSUTA is designed to make sales tax 
administration easier through the use of more efficient administrative 
procedures, novel technology, and simplification of sales tax laws.209  The 
Supreme Court itself recently applauded the various taxpayer protections that 
the SSUTA sets forth, including “a single, state level tax administration, 
uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures, 
and other uniform rules.”210  However, it remains unclear whether such 
SSUTA protections are required to tax remote internet sellers without 
violating the dormant Commerce Clause.211 
As good as it sounds, not all states are on board with the SSUTA.  Notable 
exceptions include New York, California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Arizona, and 
Illinois.212  Perhaps uncoincidentally, these states house all ten of the nation’s 
largest cities.213  Because the SSUTA requires uniformity across the state, 
member states and their municipalities are stripped of flexibility in their tax 
discretion.  Take a nonmember state such as New York, which features a 
complex web of sales and use taxes that vary by locality.214  Beyond mere 
variation in county sales and use tax rates that are layered on top of the state’s 
sales and use tax, the state allows for a wide variety of specific sales and 
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see infra Part II.C.2. 
 212. Baltz, supra note 148. 
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most-populous-cities [https://perma.cc/68RK-WW85] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
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excise taxes in New York City.215  For example, New York City levies 
special sales taxes on beauty-related services (such as those provided by 
barbers, beauticians, and the like), health and fitness clubs, and 
amusements.216  According to the New York State Department of Taxation 
and Finance, to comply with the SSUTA, such variations in tax rates, bases, 
and inclusions would be impermissible.217  Thus, states that house large cities 
with specialized, unique taxes may be less inclined to seek SSUTA 
membership, in spite of any potential efficiencies for remote sellers. 
2.  The Supreme Court:  The Dormant Commerce Clause 
While states and local governments may impose taxes on sales within their 
jurisdiction, doing so implicates Commerce Clause concerns.218  While the 
Commerce Clause explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate interstate 
commerce, the Supreme Court has further inferred a dormant Commerce 
Clause to prohibit states from “impos[ing] regulations that place an undue 
burden on interstate commerce.”219  Though principally applied as a 
limitation upon the states, the dormant Commerce Clause applies to cities as 
well.220  Because taxation of video streaming services may create such an 
undue burden, the dormant Commerce Clause represents yet another 
constraint on local governments attempting this sort of taxation. 
Under the dormant Commerce Clause, for a tax law to be valid it must:  
(1) be levied on “an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
[jurisdiction],” (2) be “fairly apportioned,” (3) “not discriminate against 
interstate commerce,” and (4) be “fairly related to the services provided by 
the [jurisdiction].”221  Of these elements, what constitutes a substantial nexus 
has been the subject of much contention, including a number of controversies 
that have made it to the Supreme Court.222 
The first case to address this nexus requirement was National Bellas Hess, 
Inc. v. Department of Revenue.223  The plaintiffs challenged Illinois’s attempt 
to collect use taxes from a mail-order company whose in-state activity was 
comprised solely of its shipping of catalogs and goods into the state through 
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 220. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-6 (3d ed. 2000). 
 221. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 222. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018); Quill Corp. v. North 
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a common carrier.224  The Supreme Court invalidated the tax because both 
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause require a physical 
presence stronger than that between the mail-order company and Illinois.225  
Ten years later in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,226 the Supreme Court 
explicitly enumerated the substantial-nexus requirement as part of its four-
part test.227  The first major refinement of what constitutes a substantial nexus 
followed in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp.228 
In Quill, the Court dealt with essentially the same facts as in Bellas 
Hess.229  This time around, however, the Court drew a sharper distinction 
between the nexus required under the Due Process Clause as opposed to the 
Commerce Clause.230  While the Due Process Clause requires purposeful 
direction of activities at the taxing state, irrespective of a physical presence 
in that state,231 the Court held that the Commerce Clause requires more 
because the core constitutional concerns and policies are different.232  The 
Court reaffirmed its holding in Bellas Hess and stressed a bright-line rule that 
requires physical presence in the state to satisfy the substantial-nexus 
requirement.233  While acknowledging that it tends to favor flexible 
balancing tests, the Court doubled down on its bright-line rule because of the 
supposed benefits both to the taxing state and taxpayers.234 
In the final portion of the opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens invited 
Congress to step in and act if it disagreed with restricting the states’ taxing 
authority in this way.235  Congress never accepted his invitation to do so.  
Professor Brian Galle of the Georgetown University Law Center suggested 
that “Justice Stevens’s gambit was never likely to succeed” because of 
Congress’s recent tendency to restrict rather than expand state taxing power 
and decision paralysis with strong interest groups at play.236  Since Quill was 
decided in 1992, the issue has only been exacerbated with the rise of powerful 
internet retailers and the dominance of e-commerce, which unlike mail-order 
companies actually have the “power to shutter whole industries.”237 
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In response to this very point, Justice Anthony Kennedy fiercely criticized 
the validity of Quill in his concurring opinion in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. 
Brohl.238  Justice Kennedy highlighted “our increasingly interconnected 
economy” as a result of the internet and online businesses’ widespread 
growth.239  He further stressed the fundamental unfairness that results from 
treating like things unlike for tax purposes and allowing local businesses to 
remain subject to local taxation while their online competitors easily dodge 
such tax obligations.240  Justice Kennedy called for an appropriate case for 
the Court to reconsider its commitment to the physical-presence 
requirement.241  In 2018, his call was answered. 
In Wayfair, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the physical-
presence requirement after South Dakota sought a declaratory judgment that 
would require online retailers to collect sales taxes in compliance with a 
newly enacted state sales-tax law.242  Faced with the very inequity expressed 
by Justice Kennedy in his Direct Marketing concurrence, South Dakota 
passed a law that would bring out-of-state sellers in line with in-state sellers 
“as if the seller had a physical presence in the state.”243  Notably, the law was 
narrowly tailored and applied only to out-of-state sellers who conducted in-
state business above a dollar or transactional threshold while specifically 
foreclosing any retroactive application.244  After the South Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the respondents, a group of 
out-of-state businesses that would be subject to the tax law if it were upheld, 
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari per South Dakota’s request.245 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the tax 
law.246  In his final majority opinion, Justice Kennedy overturned Bellas Hess 
and Quill, precedents that were so distant from the economic reality of the 
twenty-first century.247  Justice Kennedy reasoned that Quill was flawed on 
three distinct grounds:  (1) it unnecessarily conflated a substantial-nexus 
requirement with a physical-presence requirement, (2) it “create[d] rather 
than resolve[d] market distortions,” and (3) it imposed formalistic 
distinctions in contravention of modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.248  
Beyond addressing the incompatibility of the physical-requirement rule in 
the internet age, he sharply criticized the injustice the judicial branch and out-
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of-state businesses had brought upon the states.249  He argued that such a 
requirement violated vertical-federalism norms and unjustly “intrude[d] on 
States’ reasonable choices in enacting their tax systems.”250  Furthermore, 
such a rule allowed out-of-state sellers to effectively assist in tax evasion and 
deliberately drive state and local governments to insolvency.251 
In the absence of a physical-requirement rule, the Court held that South 
Dakota’s sales tax effectively applied with a substantial nexus and was thus 
constitutional.252  Since the law was designed with dollar and transactional 
minimum thresholds before the sales tax remission would be required, it 
properly applied only to a seller who “availed itself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business” in that jurisdiction.253  While settled on the 
substantial-nexus issue, the Court left open the possibility that “some other 
principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act” 
on remand.254  However, the Court highlighted key features that minimize 
any discrimination or undue burden on interstate commerce, including its 
application only to businesses that meet or surpass certain thresholds,255 a 
prohibition on retroactive application, and the state’s adoption of the SSUTA, 
which reduces administrative and compliance costs.256 
State reactions to Wayfair have varied.  Some states have developed laws 
similar to South Dakota and others have gone even further.257  Generally 
speaking, states fall into one of three categories:  (1) twenty states roughly 
follow the South Dakota approach, (2) seven states follow the South Dakota 
approach but limit or eliminate the transaction threshold, and (3) two states 
allow remission of sales taxes with a nexus to the full extent of the 
Constitution, which was expanded by Wayfair.258  Notably, Illinois has 
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followed suit and adopted the South Dakota approach.259  This may further 
bolster the validity of Labell, as Chicago has long considered a nexus with 
Illinois to be a nexus with Chicago.260 
3.  Congress:  The Internet Tax Freedom Act 
A third potential constraint on local taxation of video streaming services 
is the ITFA.  In a rare act of bipartisanship, Congress enacted the ITFA in 
1998 as a means of restricting internet taxation.261  The sponsor of the House 
bill, California Representative Chris Cox, stressed that the purpose of the Act 
was to protect the internet from the “multiple and discriminatory taxation” 
that it was susceptible to “in a way that commerce conducted in more 
traditional ways is not.”262  Thus, the ITFA specifically applies to state and 
local taxation, where multiple and discriminatory taxation would compound 
across the country.263  In particular, the ITFA created a moratorium on 
“[t]axes on Internet access”264 and “[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes on 
electronic commerce.”265  After years of extensions, the ITFA’s two-pronged 
moratorium became permanent law through the enactment of the Trade 
Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015.266  Each prong of the 
moratorium offers a distinct protection.267 
The ITFA broadly defines an “internet access service” as one that “enables 
users to connect to the Internet to access content, information, electronic mail 
or other services offered over the Internet.”268  The statute applies whether 
the tax is imposed on the provider or purchaser, irrespective of what terms 
are used in describing it.269  While internet access may include other services 
made available to users as part of such a service, the statutory language 
explicitly excludes “video programming . . . that utilize[s] Internet protocol 
or any successor protocol and for which there is a charge.”270  Although this 
definition would prohibit taxation on the underlying internet service that a 
user pays for to access internet content, such as a video streaming service, it 
would not prohibit taxation of the video streaming service itself.  Illustrative 
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of this point, a recent policy report by the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities271 stressed this distinction while addressing erosion of the sales tax 
due to cord-cutting.272 
The second prong of the ITFA’s moratorium involves electronic 
commerce, or e-commerce, which it defines as “any transaction conducted 
over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising the sale, lease, 
license, offer, or delivery of property, goods, services, or information.”273  
The statute holds that state e-commerce taxation shall be neither multiple nor 
discriminatory.274  The prohibition on multiple taxation disallows multiple 
states or political subdivisions from taxing the same, or essentially the same, 
e-commerce without offering a credit for the taxes paid in other 
jurisdictions.275  The ITFA, however, carves out an exception that allows a 
state and its own political subdivisions to tax the same e-commerce.276  The 
prohibition on discriminatory taxation is more nuanced but effectively 
disallows a jurisdiction from taxing e-commerce differently from a 
transaction or activity under traditional commerce.277  More specifically, the 
ITFA prohibits discrimination of e-commerce from traditional commerce in 
terms of which goods and services are taxable,278 which tax rate applies,279 
and which individual or entity is responsible for collecting or paying the 
tax.280 
A good example of how the ITFA is interpreted in practice is the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc.281  In Stubhub!, Chief 
Judge Frank Easterbrook interpreted the ITFA as it applied to the validity of 
an earlier Chicago amusement tax.282  The City of Chicago sought a 
declaratory judgment that StubHub!, an internet ticket auction house, was 
required to collect and remit sales taxes on Chicago ticket sales to the City in 
line with its amusement tax.283  The court first dismissed the issue of multiple 
taxation because the tax applied only to events in Chicago, and thus the 
location of the event prohibited other municipalities from levying a tax on 
 
 271. See generally MICHAEL MAZEROV, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CONGRESS 
SHOULD END—NOT EXTEND—THE BAN ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF INTERNET ACCESS 
SUBSCRIPTIONS (2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-10-14sfp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9QWZ-BW7K]. 
 272. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
 273. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1105(3). 
 274. Id. § 1101(a)(2). 
 275. Id. § 1105(6)(A). 
 276. Id. § 1105(6)(B).  For example, while Dallas and Houston may not tax the same 
e-commerce under the ITFA, Dallas and Texas may do so under this carveout. See id. 
 277. See JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43772, THE INTERNET TAX 
FREEDOM ACT:  IN BRIEF 3 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43772.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2LDK-G52B].  Traditional commerce would include, for example, purchases made in brick-
and-mortar stores or through catalogs. Id. 
 278. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1105(2)(A)(i). 
 279. Id. § 1105(2)(A)(ii). 
 280. Id. § 1105(2)(A)(iii). 
 281. 624 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 282. Id. at 366–67. 
 283. Id. at 364–65. 
2019] SAVED BY LABELL 1643 
the same e-commerce.284  Similarly, the court dismissed the issue of 
discriminatory taxation because the reseller was required to collect and remit 
the tax whether the sale occurred on the internet, in person, or otherwise:  
hence, no discrimination.285 
One final point on the ITFA involves its relation to Wayfair.286  While the 
Supreme Court never mentions the ITFA in its Wayfair opinion, 
Representative Cox argued in his amicus brief that South Dakota’s law would 
controvert both the ITFA and its policy aims.287  Representative Cox first 
argued that it was discriminatory because South Dakota’s law would impose 
the burden of tax compliance on different persons or entities when a South 
Dakota resident purchases from an out-of-state seller over the internet instead 
of in person.288  Furthermore, Cox argued that South Dakota’s tax law would 
subvert the spirit of the ITFA.289  Cox wrote that even though the law sought 
to address the “the presumed competitive burden on [South Dakota’s] in-state 
businesses and its purported lost revenue,” the law forced internet sellers to 
sift through a “maze of differing state and local rules and competing 
definitions, deadlines, filing requirements, and audit demands,” which would 
be a substantial burden on internet sellers.290 
In spite of Cox’s concerns, it appears as though not everyone agrees:  the 
issue was neither raised by the parties nor addressed by the Court.291  As the 
Tax Foundation asserted in its post-Wayfair analysis, the ITFA was likely 
not at issue because so long as state tax laws equally apply to electronic and 
traditional forms of commerce, there is no conflict.292 
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III.  ACT THREE:  FOLLOWING LABELL’S LEAD:  THE FUTURE OF 
LOCAL VIDEO STREAMING SERVICE TAXATION 
As stated by former New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, “to the 
extent we are making progress as a nation, local governments are often 
driving it.”293  Accordingly, “[b]ecause they are held accountable, local 
leaders also tend to be more willing to work with members of other political 
parties and to experiment with bold new ideas . . . mak[ing] city halls more 
nimble, more pragmatic, . . . [and] more open to experimentation.”294  Given 
these competencies, cities are uniquely situated to address declining revenues 
and state aid.295  As laboratories of democracy with a propensity for fiscal 
innovation, cities must take control of their own financial futures.296  In the 
wake of Labell, cities now have an opportunity to reflect and consider how 
to tax video streaming services, if at all.297 
As our economy continues to shift toward the internet, cities need to find 
creative ways to expand their tax bases and tap into the revenue potential that 
video streaming services provide.298  What would have once sounded 
impermissible, if not ludicrous, is increasingly becoming a modern-day 
reality:  internet sellers being taxed without discriminatorily taxing the 
internet itself.  On the retail side, Amazon, for example, now collects and 
remits sales taxes on goods in forty-six states whether or not it is legally 
required to do so.299  Even as these taxes are applied to video streaming 
services, other notable trade associations and companies, such as the Internet 
Association and Netflix itself, remain unopposed.300  What they remain 
concerned about, however, is how the tax is applied.  Netflix, for instance, 
while unopposed to taxation of its services would consider it “a dangerous 
precedent to start taxing Internet apps and websites using laws intended for 
utilities like water and electricity.”301  The notion is even more concerning 
when one considers that such utilities are taxed at roughly 14 percent, making 
them the most highly taxed services in the United States.302 
From a bird’s-eye view, it is easy to see how video streaming services such 
as Netflix and Hulu may be considered comparable to utilities like traditional 
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pay-TV and other MVPDs.  The user pays a price and in exchange gains 
access to watch video content.303  As traditional pay-TV providers make 
select video content streamable on mobile phones, computers, and the like,304 
the line between the two is blurred even further.  But as the Kentucky Board 
of Tax Appeals held in Netflix, while the similarities end there, the 
distinctions are far greater.305 
At the federal level, administrative agencies continue to keep MVPDs and 
video streaming services distinct.  The FCC has elected not to retrofit these 
services into the “clunky and outdated” term of art that is an MVPD, which 
insulates these services from a myriad of telecommunications regulations.306  
Furthermore, with the U.S. Copyright Office drawing the same distinction, 
video streaming services may not acquire copyright licenses to show 
broadcast programming even if they wanted to.307  As such, these services 
are unable to provide the live and scheduled linear programming that MVPDs 
provide. 
These distinctions merit different tax treatment.  In Netflix, the court 
specifically highlighted aspects of the FCC’s distinct treatment of video 
streaming services in finding Netflix not generally comparable to MVPDs 
and thus not subject to the state’s telecommunications tax.308  With legal 
challenges to taxing video streaming services as MVPDs either already in 
litigation, as in Creve Coeur, or ripe for litigation, such as the various 
California municipalities, cities should be wary of taxing video streaming 
services in line with MVPDs, especially when other viable options such as 
the sales and amusement taxes exist.309 
Prudent cities should take note of the relevant judicial developments from 
2018 as discussed in this Note and use them to guide future tax changes.310  
From the humble chambers of Cook County to the highest court in the land, 
judges have set forth an effective path for video streaming service taxation 
apart from MVPDS.311  It is time for cities to listen. 
This Part combines the reasoning of Labell and Wayfair to set forth a 
roadmap for future local taxation of video streaming services under the sales 
or amusement tax base.  Part III.A discusses the sales tax as applied to video 
streaming services.  It argues that while this may be an effective way to bring 
these services into the fold, its practical and theoretical drawbacks should 
make cities wary.  Part III.B instead considers the amusement tax as applied 
to video streaming services and argues that such an approach may be a 
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preferable option for cities given the easier procedural hurdles, strong 
theoretical backing, and judicial precedent in its favor. 
A.  The Sales Tax Approach Is Effective but Suffers from 
Practical and Theoretical Drawbacks 
The sales tax is one effective method to tax video streaming services 
independently of MVPDs, as illustrated by Pennsylvania.312  Previously, 
requiring extrajurisdictional sellers to collect and remit the tax may have been 
a serious challenge, but the Supreme Court’s elimination of the physical-
presence requirement in Wayfair appears to have mitigated this issue.313 
A prudent city would be mindful of the key features that contributed to the 
success of South Dakota’s tax in Wayfair, more specifically the lack of 
retroactive applicability and the existence of minimum thresholds before 
requiring collection and remission by the seller.314  Although the Court also 
highlighted South Dakota’s adoption of the SSUTA, this aspect appeared in 
dicta and seems to be more a suggestion to ease administration rather than a 
concrete constitutional requirement.315  So long as a city is mindful of these 
caveats, Wayfair not only provides support for the validity of such taxation, 
but also suggests clear rationales for such taxes, with Justice Kennedy all but 
endorsing them in light of the modern shift to an internet-based economy.316 
While an effective way to raise revenue, taxing video streaming services 
under the sales tax still brings with it two substantial drawbacks, one 
procedural and one theoretical.  From a procedural standpoint, because sales 
taxes often encompass only goods, extending the sales tax to include video 
streaming services would seem to require legislative action rather than simple 
interpretive rulemaking.317  For example, only twenty-seven states tax digital 
goods, and even fewer define video streaming services as digital goods.318  
Those that do, including Pennsylvania and Washington, did not simply issue 
interpretive rulings but instead passed legislative amendments.319  Given 
their limited tax discretion under home-rule provisions, cities that seek to do 
the same would have a procedural burden:  not only would these cities need 
legislative action from their local bodies, but they likely would require state 
approval as well.320 
The second major drawback is theoretical.  While it is perfectly reasonable 
to treat a permanent digital video download in line with physical goods under 
the sales tax, treating a video streaming service as such is a greater stretch.  
Permanent downloads represent actual ownership of something, an actual 
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purchase in the truest sense of the word.321  The same cannot be said for 
typical video streaming services, where viewing particular video content is 
restricted to a specific rental period, as is the case for TVODs such as iTunes, 
or conditioned upon a continued subscription, as is the case for SVODs such 
as Netflix.322  Perhaps for this very reason, some states that allow for the 
taxation of digital goods explicitly exclude video streaming services,323 and 
cities that have sales taxes have opted to tax video streaming services outside 
of the sales tax base, as Chicago did with its amusement tax.324 
B.  The Amusement Tax Has Numerous Advantages, 
Including Clear Judicial Support 
Instead of treating a user’s purchase of video streaming services as the use 
of a utility or purchase of a digital good, tax authorities should consider such 
a purchase for what it is—a license to view an amusement.  For instance, 
when a consumer pays for a license to view a movie at a movie theater or a 
baseball game at a stadium, she is subject to the amusement tax.325  It is a 
reasonable extension for the same to apply when such amusement takes place 
on the internet.  Using Netflix as an example, when a user pays her monthly 
subscription bill, she is given a login which allows her to stream all of 
Netflix’s movies and shows.326  Recasting the user’s login as a ticket, the 
transaction is no different than any other amusement transaction where a user 
pays for a ticket to view an amusement. 
Of course, some may take issue with comparing a solitary Netflix viewing 
to an amusement like a public sporting event, theatrical performance, or 
movie.  This Note argues two responses in the alternative.  First, there is no 
built-in explicit requirement that a user must take part in an amusement of a 
social nature for the tax to apply.327  On the contrary, while one may attend 
a movie screening at a theater with other individuals, socializing does not 
take place during the actual viewing of the movie. 
Second, assuming some inherent public-facing social requirement under 
an ejusdem generis argument,328 the internet nature of video streaming 
services is both the problem and the solution.  Yet another way the internet 
has changed our world is via its social upheaval.  With Facebook, Twitter, 
Reddit, and a litany of messaging apps, Netflix users can communicate about 
their experiences with friends and other users in real time and socialize just 
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as they would at other in-person amusements.329  In fact, one of Netflix’s 
core competencies is its ability to provide entertainment that generates 
greater social media virality than its peers.330  For example, take the 
extraordinary social buzz surrounding Netflix’s recent film Bird Box.331  The 
thriller is set in a post-apocalyptic world where survivors must blindfold 
themselves to outlast mysterious forces that kill upon sight.332  After its 
December 21, 2018, launch on the video streaming service, Bird Box not only 
garnered a record-setting forty-five million streams in just two weeks, but 
spawned countless memes and real-life “challenges” where individuals 
attempt to navigate life blindfolded.333  As this illustrates, while viewing 
video streaming services may seem solitary, video streaming services often 
generate mass social interactions, both online and in person, and thus may be 
comparable to the examples provided for in amusement tax statutes. 
In practice, a video streaming service need not fit perfectly with related 
amusements under existing amusement tax laws.  In 2014, for example, a 
hotly contested “yoga tax” was passed in Washington, D.C. that treated yoga, 
an arguably spiritual practice rather than a physical one, in line with gyms 
and recreational sports despite criticism to the contrary.334  However, even if 
video streaming services like Netflix are considered generally comparable to 
amusements under amusement tax statutes, cities should not sit back and 
expect these companies to voluntarily make the leap and accept duties to 
collect from city consumers.335  It is time for cities to remove their blindfolds, 
recognize the tax loophole that allows these streaming services to go untaxed, 
and address the situation head-on.  This is the exact purpose of interpretive 
rulings, which allow a tax commissioner to clarify where ambiguity exists 
and exercise expertise that is afforded deference by the courts.336  Where an 
amusement tax is enumerated with specific examples but included with broad 
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encompassing language such as “any” or “similar,” the term may be 
construed descriptively rather than restrictively.337  An administrative 
interpretation that clarifies this broad language is not impermissible but is, 
on the contrary, afforded weight by the courts.338  This was the very approach 
taken by Chicago’s tax commissioner, which the court upheld in Labell.339 
Labell provides a clear legal roadmap for cities to tax video streaming 
services under amusement taxes without implicating legal concerns.  
Particularly, Labell suggests answers to the three key constraints on local 
taxation described in Part II.C, including restrictions by states, the Supreme 
Court, and Congress. 
First, as to state restrictions, many noteworthy cities, including Chicago, 
Philadelphia, New York City, and Santa Cruz, already have amusement taxes 
on the books.340  So long as these tax statutes are written broadly rather than 
restrictively, it is well within a tax commissioner’s powers to issue an 
interpretive ruling rather than implicate the legislative process and the 
corresponding home-rule issues.341  For example, while the plaintiffs in 
Labell originally challenged the tax commissioner’s authority in issuing 
Amusement Tax Ruling #5, the plaintiffs later dropped this argument, and 
the case largely narrowed to the federal issues at play.342 
However, even where a city has a restrictive amusement tax, or lacks one 
altogether, the amusement tax still retains a significant procedural advantage 
over its sales tax counterpart.  As a specialized tax, the amusement tax often 
skirts cumbersome procedural requirements and avoids required local 
resident voting or state legislative authorization.343  As such, changing or 
implementing an amusement tax is comparatively easy. 
Second, as to dormant Commerce Clause issues, Labell found the 
substantial-nexus requirement satisfied, even before the standard was 
considerably lowered in Wayfair.344  Chicago follows Illinois’s nexus 
requirement, which has since adopted the very sort of tax collection and 
remission requirements that were upheld in Wayfair.345  While Wayfair dealt 
specifically with a sales tax, the amusement tax may be recast as such under 
the substance-over-form doctrine given that both are consumption taxes 
applied on a percentage basis.346  Thus, even the amusement tax may be 
bolstered by the Court’s holding in Wayfair. 
Third, as to the ITFA issue, as Labell held, taxing video streaming services 
as amusements does not pose a substantial risk of multiple taxation because 
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the tax relied on a user’s Chicago address and was not discriminatory.347  
Given the ITFA’s policy aim of preventing disparate treatment of the internet 
for fear of internet discrimination, amusement taxes not only conform to such 
a policy aim but reinforce it.  Without video streaming service taxation in 
line with other amusements, online amusements such as Netflix are not 
discriminated against but rather given an unfair advantage.  Taxing them in 
line with their in-person counterparts under the amusement tax would place 
the internet on equal footing with in-person amusements and promote the 
very sort of equity sought by the ITFA.348 
CONCLUSION 
While the amusement tax provides a usable model for cities to follow, not 
all cities have such a tax base, especially those in states that have adopted the 
SSUTA.  With extensive variety in consumption taxes and the practical 
difficulty of passing new taxes given the tight constraints of home-rule 
provisions, cities should feel empowered to issue interpretive rulings 
wherever appropriate to bring video streaming service tax revenue into their 
coffers.  While such an attempt may pose greater legal challenges, cities 
should not be afraid to get creative to raise revenue.  They should just 
remember that when dealing with a tough legal challenge, they should hire 
Billy Flynn and razzle-dazzle away. 
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